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I. INTRODUCTION
Royalty issues, ranging from the method of calculation to the effect
of division orders on claims for back royalty, have long been a source of
dispute between lessors and producers. Two of the most recent additions
to the list of royalty issues are: (1) claims by royalty owners to share in
proceeds from take-or-pay clauses or in settlements of take-or-pay dis-
putes between producers and pipeline purchasers, and (2) questions over
the effect of split-stream connections and balancing agreements on the
division of proceeds among royalty owners. A much older but still unset-
tled issue is the effect of division orders on claims by royalty owners to
recover royalties which were allegedly underpaid in past years.
Part II of this paper discusses the viability of claims to royalty on
take-or-pay related payments and the problem of calculating royalty
when a lessee is participating in a pooling agreement which has given rise
either to split-stream sales or underproduction by the lessee. Part III
deals with recent decisions discussing the effect of other instruments, es-
pecially division orders, on the lessee's obligations under an oil and gas
lease. Part IV attempts to assess how division orders affect the types of
royalty claims discussed in Part II.
[Vol. 24:509
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II. CURRENT ISSUES OVER THE RIGHT TO ROYALTY AND THE
CALCULATION OF ROYALTY
A. Payments Made Because of Take-or-Pay Obligations
An issue increasingly in dispute between lessors and lessees is the
right of royalty owners to share in proceeds which an operator has re-
ceived under a take-or-pay clause. Such clauses, which are common in
gas purchase contracts entered into in the last two decades, obligate the
pipeline purchaser to take a specified percentage of a well's delivery ca-
pacity. The pipeline is required to pay for the prescribed amount of gas,
even if it fails to take it. Under most contracts, however, the pipeline has
a stipulated period, such as five years, in which it can "make up" by
taking gas in excess of a current year's take requirements and crediting
the excess take against the amount paid for the earlier deficiency.'
1. Payments Made Pursuant to the Take-or-Pay Clause:
Existing Case Law
Many lessors are now claiming they are owed royalty on payments
made pursuant to the take-or-pay clause. The operators, by and large,
have countered with the argument that no royalty is due until the gas is
actually produced and delivered. Under the logic of this argument the
lessor's right to royalty is deferred until the make-up option has been
exercised. As thus formulated, the dispute is essentially over when the
royalty is due: at the time the payment is made or as gas allocable to the
payment is taken by the purchaser.
To date, there have been only a few cases dealing with this issue, and
they have been resolved in favor of the producer. Recently the Fifth
Circuit in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel2 rendered its
decision on conflicting holdings from the Western and Eastern Districts
of Louisiana, which had been consolidated on appeal. In the litigation
involving Diamond Shamrock, the United States, as lessor, asserted a
right to unpaid royalties and accumulated interest on take-or-pay pro-
ceeds received by its lessee on gas production from federal lands. In an
opinion which was not reported in the advance sheets, the federal judge
1. For a discussion of the issues which may be involved in a dispute between a producer and a
pipeline over a take-or-pay contract, see Medina, The Take-or-Pay Wars: A Further Status Report,
41 OKLA. L. REv. 381 (1988); Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain
Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REv. 185 (1986); Roland,
Take-or-Pay Provisions: Major Problems for the Natural Gas Industry, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 251
(1986).
2. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
1989]
3
Smith: Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay Claims and Division Orders
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
for the Eastern District of Louisiana had held that royalty was due on
such proceeds since they were part of the revenue gained from exercising
the right to drill for, remove, and dispose of oil and gas which had been
granted to the lessee?
The opposite result was reached by the judge for the Western Dis-
trict on almost identical facts. In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. United States
Department of Interior,4 the United States had executed an oil and gas
lease that required the lessee "[to pay the Lessor a royalty of 16 2/3
percent in amount or value of production saved, removed, or sold from
the leased area."' Mesa, the lessee, had received payments from Tennes-
see Pipeline Company ("Tennessee") under a take-or-pay clause con-
tained in a natural gas purchase contract between the two companies. In
rejecting the government's claim for royalties on payments for gas not
yet taken, the court relied on the meaning of "royalty" as commonly
understood in the oil and gas industry: a right to share in production as
production is obtained.6 According to the court, "production" refers to
the removal or actual severance of oil and gas from the ground.' Since
the payments made by Tennessee were "in lieu of taking production,"
Mesa was not required to remit royalties on such payments.'
The Fifth Circuit's decision favored the producers. It agreed with
the reasoning of the lower court in Mesa that "production," when used in
the context of the royalty clause, means "the actual physical severance of
minerals from the formation."9 Further, it pointed out that payments
made pursuant to take-or-pay clauses were not made for the sale of gas,
but for the failure to take the gas.1" The producer has fixed charges, such
as service on its indebtedness, maintenance costs, and its initial capital
investment, which must be met. The purpose of the take-or-pay provi-
sion is to give the producer a continuous, stable, assured source of reve-
nue which will cover these financial commitments.
An identical result was reached by the Wyoming Supreme Court in
State v. Pennzoil Co. I Wyoming had executed an oil and gas lease pro-
viding that on gas "produced from said land saved and sold or used off
3. Id. at 1163.
4. 647 F.Supp. 1350 (W.D. La. 1986).
5. Id. at 1352.
6. Id. at 1354.
7. Id. at 1353-54.
8. Id.
9. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1168, (5th Cir. 1988).
10. Id. at 1167.
11. 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988).
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the premises" 12 the lessee would pay a royalty "of one-eighth of the gas
so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be
one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale."' 3 The state asserted
that this royalty language entitled it to royalties on take-or-pay payments
made by the pipeline buying gas from the lessees under gas purchase
contracts. The Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis of the lease terms,
which it found to be unambiguous, was similar to that of the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The court reasoned that the lease language which required the pay-
ment of royalty on the twentieth day of the month "following the month
of production and removal and sale of oil and gas from said land,"
clearly used the term "production" to mean the physical extraction of
gas from the ground. 4 Since the "sale" takes place after severance, the
lease did not require the payment of royalties on monies received for
unproduced gas. 15
2. Effect of Lease Language
As the decisions in Diamond Shamrock and Pennzoil indicate, a de-
termination of the lessor's right to royalty on take-or-pay payments turns
in large part upon a construction of the royalty and related clauses in the
oil and gas lease. Hence, the decisions are no guarantee that similar dis-
putes will be resolved in favor of the producer. Differences in lease lan-
guage may possibly lead to different results, even for lessors pooled into
the same gas well unif. In some instances courts may conclude that roy-
alty language is ambiguous and allow the admission of extrinsic evidence
to determine the parties' intent with respect to take-or-pay payments. In
others, federal or state regulations may modify or define terms used in
the lease.'6 In other instances, the presence or absence of key terminol-
ogy and prior judicial definitions of that terminology will determine the
rights of the parties to the lease.' 7
12. Id. at 976.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 979.
15. Id. at 980.
16. For example, in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir.
1988), the Fifth Circuit was essentially resolving conflicting interpretations of the impact of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act on the calculation of royalty under offshore oil and gas leases.
Id. at 1163, 1166.
17. For example, a prior judicial definition of the terms "proceeds" or "market value" may
determine whether royalty is due.
1989]
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a. When Is Gas "Produced"?
In the litigated disputes the leases apparently limited the lessor's
royalty to gas produced and saved. The conclusion in Diamond Sham-
rock and Pennzoil that "production" clearly means severance is fully con-
sistent with a common sense interpretation and industry usage of the
word. It is not, however, the universally applied meaning of the term
when used in an oil and gas lease. For example, courts in some states,
when determining if a lease has been held past the primary term by the
production of oil and gas, have not required the physical severance of the
substances from the ground."s As Professor Eugene Kuntz has pointed
out in summarizing the holdings construing the requirement of "produc-
tion" to extend a lease past the primary term:
[T]hree rules have been developed. According to one rule, the discov-
ery of either oil or gas will satisfy the habendum clause. According to
a second rule, gas and oil are distinguished because oil may be ex-
tracted and stored economically without marketing, whereas gas can-
not be economically stored above ground. Under such rule, the
discovery of gas is sufficient, but if oil is discovered, the oil must be
actually extracted in order to satisfy the habendum clause. According
to the third rule, mere discovery of oil or gas will not satisfy the haben-
dum clause, but in both instances the product must be actually ex-
tracted. In the instance of gas, this necessarily involves marketing. As
a matter of generality, each jurisdiction which has decided the point
has adopted one of such rules.19
The same term does not have to be given the same meaning wher-
ever used in an oil and gas lease. As Professor Kuntz notes, some states,
in construing the habendum clause, have interpreted production to mean
different things for different substances.2 0 Thus oil is produced only if
extracted, whereas gas is produced if discovered in paying quantities.2 '
Arguably, "production" may not require severance when used in the roy-
alty clause, regardless of its meaning when used in the habendum clause.
These arguments are not entirely convincing, however. The juris-
dictions that have given the term "production" an artificial meaning in
the context of the habendum clause have done so largely to protect a
18. See, eg., McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 (Okua. 1958).
19. 2 E. KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.6, at 343 (1989). See also,
E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, 0. ANDERSON, E. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW
169-70 (1986).
20. 2 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.6, supra at 341.
21. See, eg., Christian v. A.A. Oil Corp., 161 Mont. 420, 506 P.2d 1369 (1973).
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lessee against loss of a proven lease on which the lessee has spent consid-
erable sums of money in high risk exploration and drilling. Much differ-
ent factors are involved with take-or-pay proceeds. Moreover, courts in
many states, including Texas, have not adopted this definition. They
have held that oil and gas must actually be extracted to hold the lease
past the primary term.22 In these states, "production," wherever used in
the oil and gas lease, has been construed as referring to physical sever-
ance of oil or gas from the ground. It seems unlikely that the parties
could have intended for it to mean something different when used in the
royalty clause.
b. When Is Gas "Sold"?
The meaning of "sold" is also relevant to a claim to royalties on
take-or-pay proceeds. In "proceeds" clauses, royalties are based on gas
"sold." Most require that the gas be produced as well as sold, but some
forms of leases which provide for royalties on gas "marketed" or "sold"
do not specifically require that it be "produced." For example, a form
lease widely used in Kansas and Oklahoma, and occasionally encoun-
tered in Texas, provides that "the lessee shall monthly pay lessor as roy-
alty on gas marketed from each well where gas only is found, one-eighth
(1/8) of the proceeds if sold at the well, or if marketed by lessee off the
leased premises, one-eighth (1/8) of its market value at the well."23 Pro-
duction may also not be required in specially drafted provisions included
in a lease to provide a landowner with an additional royalty.
Under such provisions the jurisdiction's position on the market-
value issue may be especially relevant in determining when gas is "sold"
and thus whether royalties are due on take-or-pay proceeds.24 In states
like Texas, which hold that gas is sold "at the time of the delivery to the
purchaser,"25 payments for gas which is still unproduced and undellv-
ered should not logically be subject to the landowner's claim to royalty.
In jurisdictions like Oklahoma, which have rejected this view and treat
the gas' value as determined when the gas purchase contract is entered
22. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 $.W.2d 746,749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937,
writ ref'd).
23. C Oil and Gas Lease, Form 88 Producers 1957, rev, 1974; P & M Printing Company,
reproduced in Form Supplement, 1987 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. (Short Course).
24. See Kramer, Royalty Obligations Under the Gun-The Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses on the
Duty to Make Royalty Payments, 39 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 5-1 (1988).
25. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968).
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into,26 take-or-pay payments could well be treated as part of the consid-
eration for all of the gas purchased. In that event royalty would be owed
on such proceeds. The Wyoming Supreme Court touched on this issue in
its opinion in State v. Pennzoil Co.27 when it concluded that a "sale"
requires the passage of title and that under Wyoming law, which deems
an oil and gas lease to create a profit a prendre rather than passing title to
oil and gas in place, title to the gas can not be transferred until it is
produced and severed from the ground.2"
3. Lease Benefits and the Implied Marketing Covenant
The interpretations of royalty clause language, such as "produced"
and "sold," which are most favorable to a lessor's claim to share in take-
or-pay payments, draw little support from case law in most states. This
does not mean, of course, that the issue is resolved. Leases with unusual
royalty language may clearly entitle the lessor to share in such payments.
Additionally, some arguments in favor of lessor claims can be fashioned
which do not depend upon the specific wording of individual royalty
clauses.
A further argument in favor of the lessor's claim to proceeds for gas
still in the ground might be derived from the courts' long-standing posi-
tion that the payment of royalty is the principal consideration for an oil
and gas lease.29 Such economic benefits, rather than production per se,
have prompted the landowner to transfer exploration and development
rights to the oil company. A lessor might argue that a royalty is owed on
such benefits, even in the absence of actual severance of gas from the
reservoir.
Professor John Lowe has suggested a further refinement of this ar-
gument, basing it on the implied marketing covenant. In Current Lease
and Royalty Problems in the Gas Industry,30 he makes the following
observation:
[T]here are many cases in which courts, in interpreting oil and gas
leases, have looked beyond the literal terms of the lease to focus upon
the broader general intent of the parties. The basic agreement of the
oil and gas lease is that the owner of mineral rights, who does not
generally have the equipment, the capital, or the expertise to develop
26. Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Okla. 1981).
27. 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988).
28. Id. at 980.
29. See, e-g., Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 809-10 (8th Cir. 1905); Consumers' Gas
Trust Co. v. Littler, 162 Ind. 320, 323, 70 N.E. 363, 365 (1904).
30. 23 TULSA L.J. 547 (1988).
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them, transfers the right to drill and produce to an oil company that
supposedly does have the equipment, capital, and expertise to develop.
From that tacit understanding of the parties a variety of implied cove-
nants arise, including an implied promise of the lessee to market within
a reasonable period of time and for the best price available. From rec-
ognition of an implied promise to market on the best available terms to
recognition of a right of a royalty owner to share in whatever benefits
are provided by the lessee's marketing efforts is but a step.3 '
The strength of these arguments is difficult to assess. They are based
upon extrapolations from cases involving quite different fact patterns.
Thus, although royalties are clearly the principal consideration for an oil
and gas lease, they are royalties on oil or gas produced. The cases em-
phasizing the importance of royalties usually do so in the context of a
lessor's claim that wells should have been drilled so that production can
be obtained.32 The marketing covenant cases, such as Amoco Production
Co. v. First Baptist Church 33 and Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Hagen 34 are
close in point, but still distinguishable. Such cases commonly involve
claims that the lessee has bargained for benefits for itself at the expense of
the lessor. As indicated previously, the logic of the lessees' position in
disputes over take-or-pay proceeds does not deny the lessors' claims to
royalty but merely postpones payment until the time when gas is made
up. This was, in fact, the practice of most lessees involved in the Fifth
Circuit case.35
4. Effect of Failure to Make Up Gas Paid For
A conclusion that the lessor has no current right to share in take-or-
pay proceeds does not entirely dispose of the problem. Where the pur-
chaser exercises its make-up rights in full, take-or-pay proceeds clearly
constitute prepayments for gas later produced, and the lessor should be
entitled to royalties on the take-or-pay proceeds as the gas allocable to
such proceeds are later taken by the pipeline. In other instances, how-
ever, the purchaser may not be able or willing to exercise its make-up
rights. If the producer is contractually obligated to return take-or-pay
31. Id. at 563 (footnotes omitted).
32. See, eg., Brewster, 140 F. at 809-10 (Lessor sought to avoid lease on the ground that lessee
breached an implied covenant of due diligence in failing to drill.): Consumers' Gas Trust, 162 Ind. at
322, 70 N.E. at 364 (Lessor sued to quiet title in lands against oil and gas contract for nonperform-
ance of drilling obligations.).
33. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979), writ ref'd per curiam n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d
610 (Tex. 1980).
34. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140, withdrawn, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988) (case settled).
35. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
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proceeds allocable to gas never received, the lessor would seem to have
no basis for a claim to share in such proceeds or, to the extent they were
received, would be similarly obligated to refund them to the purchaser.
Conversely, if the gas purchase contract entitles the producer to retain
take-or-pay proceeds, even though the pipeline never makes up the gas
paid for, such proceeds have had the practical effect of increasing the
price paid for gas actually produced. In such a situation, the lessor
should be entitled to a share of royalties once the make-up right has
terminated.
5. Royalty Claims on Settlements of Take-or-Pay Disputes
The previous discussion presupposes that payments were made in
accordance with the take-or-pay clause of the gas purchase contract. In
many instances, however, the pipeline purchaser's obligation to make
such a payment will be in dispute. Payments made in settlement of such
disputes give rise to a somewhat different problem.
a. The Unshared Benefit/Implied Covenant Argument
Professor Richard Pierce has argued that lump-sum payments made
to settle past take-or-pay claims should be distinguished from routine
payments made in accordance with the contractual provision.3 6 He ar-
gues that if the settlement terminates the pipeline's right to make up gas
not taken during the period covered by the settlement, the royalty owner
will have no later opportunity to claim part of the settlement as gas is
produced. 7 Indeed, once the gas is produced, it will almost invariably be
sold under a new contract which establishes a price significantly lower
than the price provided for in the disputed take-or-pay clause. As he
points out, "If producers are allowed to retain all of one part of the set-
tlement (the lump-sum payment), but must share with royalty owners
another part of the settlement (proceeds from future sales under the con-
tract), producers have an artificial incentive to maximize the lump-sum
settlement and minimize future prices."38
Professor Kramer and Professor Lowe have independently reached
the same conclusion, but by applying the implied covenant to market.
They suggest that under the reasoning of Amoco Pr6duction Co. v. First
36. Pierce, Lessor/Lessee Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N, 8-1, 8-19 to 8-20 (1987).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 8-20.
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Baptist Church 39 a violation of the implied covenant occurs if the lessee
receives a substantial benefit which is not shared with the lessor and,
indeed, deprives him of income that he otherwise would have received.'
Even here, however, the objection may be raised that the gas to
which the settlement money relates has not yet been produced. Hence
the lessor has no right to royalty on the settlement proceeds until produc-
tion occurs. This argument may have some force if the contract remains
in force. In such a situation the settlement proceeds can be deemed to
relate to gas produced during the remaining life of the contract and the
lessor's share in the proceeds should be spread over that period. This
method of allocation may result in some complicated accounting
problems with the lessor, however, and is inappropriate if the contract
terminates. If the contract is ended, there is no reasonable way to allo-
cate settlement proceeds to gas produced under an entirely different con-
tract with, perhaps, an entirely different purchaser. If the marketing
covenant analysis entitles the lessor to share, the lessor's claim is
immediate.
b. Multi-Lease Settlements
A far more difficult situation will arise if the payment for past take-
or-pay violations relates to several different oil and gas leases held by the
producer. If the dispute proceeds to litigation and a final jury verdict,
there presumably will be evidence of the amount of gas for which the
pipeline is liable and some basis for calculating how the award should be
apportioned among the operator and the various lessors. Such evidence
may not be present in a take-or-pay settlement. Such a settlement may
cover dozens (or hundreds) of leases; and the settlement itself, while re-
citing the variety of controversies it governs, is unlikely to make an allo-
cation to specific wells. Suppose, for example, a $10,000,000 settlement
which extinguishes a claim for $25,000,000 relating to take-or-pay con-
tracts covering twenty wells. In such an instance two questions are likely
to arise with respect to a lessor's rights: Is the lessor entitled to a royalty
on that portion of the settlement allocable to his lease? If so, how much
of the settlement should be allocated thereto?
The answer to the first question depends primarily upon the strength
39. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd per curiam n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d
610 (Tex. 1980).
40. Kramer, Royalty Obligations Under the Gun-the Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses on the Duty
to Make Royalty Payments, 39 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 5-1 (1988); Lowe, Current Lease
and Royalty Problems in the Gas Industry, 23 TULSA L.J. 547, 563 (1988).
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of the argument based upon the implied marketing covenant. An affirm-
ative answer leads to the second, equally difficult question. A full discus-
sion of this problem is outside the scope of this paper, but the general
outlines of three possible arguments may be as follow: First, the lessor
may argue that the burden of proof on this issue should lie with the oper-
ator. By failing to stipulate what portions of the settlement are allocable
to each gas lease covered by the settlement, the operator has, in a sense,
"commingled" all parts of the settlement, including the operator's own
and that of all the royalty owners. The operator thus has the burden of
establishing what percentage of the settlement belongs to the operator
and what to each royalty owner. If the operator is unable to establish
these percentages, a lessor may be entitled to treat the settlement as in-
cluding a payment in full of the entire take-or-pay claim allocable to the
lessor's lease.41
A second approach, which is less harsh to the lessee, would be to
apportion the settlement among the various leases on a percentage basis.
The apportionment would be in accordance with the ratio that the
amount in dispute from a lease bore to the total amount in dispute.
Thirdly, the operator may well take the position that the burden of
proof lies entirely with the royalty owners. Since the settlement does not
relate to actual production, each lessor should have the burden of show-
ing the extent to which the settlement related to the gas purchase con-
tract binding the gas from his lease. There are, of course, other
alternative solutions, and the facts of each settlement will suggest other
approaches.
B. Delayed Marketing and Gas Imbalances
A much different set of royalty issues is likely to arise whenever two
or more tracts are pooled into a single gas unit. If the leases on the
pooled tracts are owned by different working interest owners and if there
is any difference in the identity of royalty owners, method of calculating
royalty, or size of royalty in the tracts, a dispute over rights to royalty is
likely. However, the most serious royalty problem arises when gas is
being produced from the unit, but one of the lessees who has pooled its
tract into the unit is not marketing its share of the gas. Its lessors will
almost certainly insist that they are owed royalty, although the lessee is
41. Cf. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
875 (1977).
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receiving no income from the well and the price upon which the royalty
should be calculated may be far from clear.
When tracts are pooled the working interest owners' rights in the
gas production are governed by their operating agreement. Most operat-
ing agreements are similar-or identical to-the Form 610-Model Form
Operating Agreement promulgated by the American Association of Pe-
troleum Landmen (AAPL) in that they specifically authorize each party
"to take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate share" of the
gas produced from the contract area.4' Sales of production in exact pro-
portion to ownership are unlikely, however. Some working interest own-
ers may be selling gas to pipelines or end-users while others, either
unable to obtain contracts or unwilling to sell at current prices, are
neither taking nor disposing of their share of the gas. Even if all working
interest owners in the unit are marketing gas, disproportionate takes are
almost inevitable if more than one pipeline has connections to the well.43
The problems resulting from these gas imbalances are likely to be exacer-
bated by the different prices received under the different gas purchase
contracts.
In many instances these problems will be addressed in a gas balanc-
ing agreement that has been attached to the operating agreement.' In
others, the parties will be left to work out their rights from the rather
sparse language of the operating agreement.4 These instruments are not
likely to be binding on the royalty owners, however. The primary source
of their rights to share in the income from production is the oil and gas
lease. The typical oil and gas lease provides for pooling, but makes no
mention of delayed sales from a producing well or rights of an under-
produced party to make up in kind or in cash from an overproduced
party. The lease is almost invariably worded, based on the assumption
that the lessee will produce and sell all of the gas. Hence in many, per-
haps most, situations where a lessee in a pooled unit has delayed market-
ing its share of gas or is selling at a different price than another working
interest owner, the lessor's claim to royalty will be determined by lease
language that was not drafted with such situations in mind.
42. 1982 Model Form Art. VI.C.; 1977 Model Form Art. VI.C.; 1956 Model Form 13.
43. See Note, Oil and Gas: Production Imbalance in Split Stream Gas Wells-Getting Your Fair
Share, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 955 (1977).
44. See R. Grable, Selected Problems in Split-Stream Production, (presented at Advanced Oil,
Gas and Mineral Law Course, Paper C, State Bar of Texas, Sept. 17, 1987).
45. See Smith, Gas Marketing by Co-Owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Les-
sors' Claims to Royalty, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 365 (1987).
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1. Methods of Allocating Production Among Tracts
in a Pooled Unit
Two principal legal theories have been used in resolving the royalty
issues created by gas imbalances and differing sales prices. The two ap-
proaches are best exemplified by cases in Oklahoma and Louisiana.
Oklahoma's approach is set out in Shell Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation
Commission,46 commonly referred to as the Blanchard decision. It calls
for payments to be made to all royalty owners within the unit, regardless
of whether their lessees are selling gas, and provides that the royalty pay-
ments are to be based on the "weighted-average" of the prices received
by the sellers. This holding is based upon the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's construction of an Oklahoma statute47 providing that each lessor
should share proportionately in one eighth of all production from the
unit.
The alternative "tract allocation" theory, which has been followed
in Louisiana, also has a statutory basis in a forced-pooling statute.48
Under this approach each tract within a pooled unit is treated as if it
actually produced the oil or gas which has been allocated to it under a
surface acre formula. Thus each lessor is entitled to a royalty based upon
the price actually received by his own lessee; if lessee is not marketing
gas, the lessee may be obligated to account to the lessor out of its own
monies.49
The Oklahoma and Louisiana cases rely heavily upon the language
of each jurisdiction's forced-pooling statute. Hence the language of a
state's forced-pooling statute should be of special significance in indicat-
ing which rule will ultimately be adopted in a state which has not yet
judicially opted for an allocation rule. However in states like Texas,
where pooling is typically accomplished voluntarily, rather than through
forced-pooling, a standard resolution of the royalty issues posed by gas
imbalances and differing sales prices may be impossible. The method of
allocation may depend primarily upon the language of individual leases.
a. Allocation Under Texas Case Law and Texas Leases
The only Texas case directly deciding these issues is Puckett v. First
46. 389 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1963).
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(d) (1961).
48. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Prod. Co., 221 La. 608, 60 So. 2d 9
(1952).
49. See Upchurch, Split-Stream Gas Sales and the Gas Storage and Balancing Agreement, 24
RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 665, 669-70 (1978).
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City National Bank,5" which involved royalty computation on a split-
stream sale. The lessor's land had been pooled, and the gas produced
from the well on the pooled unit was being sold to different purchasers at
different prices. The court rejected the argument that all lessors whose
land was included in the unit should receive a royalty based upon the
weighted-average price of all the gas sold. Instead, it adopted the tract
allocation method and concluded that each lessor's royalty should be
based upon the price received by his lessee for the gas which it sold. The
court's reasoning was primarily grounded in the language of the oil and
gas lease and the division order signed by the lessors. According to the
court, the lease royalty clause, which provided that the lessee would
make payments based on "the market value of the gas so sold or used,"
required the lessors to look to the sales of gas by their own lessee and did
not authorize a claim to royalty based on sales by other lessees that had
joined in the pooled unit.5 1 The pooling clause, which stipulated that the
lessor would receive "on production from a unit so pooled only such
portion of the royalty stipulated herein as the amount of his acreage
placed in the unit ... on an acreage basis bears to the total acreage so
pooled in the particular unit," did not expand the right to royalty to
include a proportionate share of the proceeds from the sale of all unit
production.52
The royalty language relied on by the Puckett court does not point
particularly strongly toward the court's conclusion. The clause-or at
least that portion quoted in the opinion-provided for royalties calcu-
lated on the basis of market value; hence, the lease royalties were not
necessarily tied to any price received by lessee. If such language clearly
indicates a tract allocation method of awarding royalty, as the court
held, it is difficult to imagine many lease forms which would be construed
differently. Royalty language providing for payments based directly
upon sale proceeds is far more susceptible to the court's argument than
the market value language of the clause in the case. Indeed, some royalty
clauses are even explicit about the identity of funds. For example, one
form provides for a royalty
on gas... produced from said land and sold or used beyond the well
... an amount equal to one-eighth of the net amount realized by
Lessee computed at the wellhead from the sale of such substances. On
50. 702 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Id. at 235-36.
52. Id.
1989]
15
Smith: Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay Claims and Division Orders
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
gas sold at the well, the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount real-
ized by Lessee from such sale. 53
Such language could hardly be construed as basing royalty on any price
other than that actually received by the lessee.
The decision in Puckett does not rest entirely upon the lease lan-
guage; the court also relies upon the terms of the division orders. They
provided for "[s]ettlement... on the basis of the proceeds derived from
sales of such production and upon the volume computations made by the
purchaser(s) thereof."54 Since the division orders were addressed to the
lessee, the court concluded that the sales referred to in the order neces-
sarily meant sales by the lessee. 5
The division orders, like the royalty clause, are not crystal clear in
specifying which sales are referred to. However, these facts probably
strengthen rather than weaken the precedential weight of the decision. If
rather vaguely worded instruments can be construed as unambiguously
evidencing an intent to use the tract allocation method of royalty compu-
tation, it seems doubtful that many printed lease or division order forms
employ language pointing toward price averaging.
A somewhat earlier case, TXO Production Corp. v. Prickette,56 also
discussed royalty issues, but in the context of deciding a dispute over
venue. The Prickette case involved delayed marketing by a lessee, and
the issue was whether the lessor was entitled to his royalty from the date
of first production from the gas unit with which his land had been pooled
or whether his right to royalty arose when his lessee first sold its share of
gas.
The court in Prickette also looked primarily to the language of the
lease in deciding the controversy. The lease clause it focused on was the
pooling clause rather than the royalty provision. The pooling clause con-
tained standard language providing that production from any part of the
pooled unit should be considered as if it had been produced from the
leased acreage and that royalties should be computed on the portion of
the production allocated to the leased acreage "just as though such pro-
duction were from such land."57 Since the court did not quote the roy-
alty language, its conclusion that the lease unequivocally entitled the
53. E. KUNTz, J. LOWE, 0. ANDERSON, E. SMITH, OIL AND GAS FORMS MANUAL, Form 7,
63, 66 (1987).
54. Puckett, 702 S.W.2d at 235.
55. Id. at 236.
56. 653 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1983).
57. Id. at 644.
[Vol. 24:509
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss4/1
ROYALTY ISSUES
lessor to a royalty from the time production first commenced is some-
what difficult to evaluate. A royalty based on "the amount realized by
Lessee from such sale" or a proceeds royalty making no reference to "gas
produced from said land" would at least interject some element of uncer-
tainty. If, however, the royalty clause contained the more common lan-
guage simply referring to the sale of gas produced from the leased land,
the court's analysis is difficult to fault.
Because the Prickette court suggests that the lessor can recover a
royalty based upon sales of gas made by a party other than his own
lessee,5 8 the case is occasionally cited as support for the "weighted aver-
age" method of royalty computation and as a countervailing authority to
Puckett. Such a use of the decision is misleading. Both decisions are
based primarily upon the language of the leases involved in the individual
controversies. Neither purports to articulate a standard rule to be used
in all such controversies. Moreover, both the reasoning and the result
reached in Puckett are consistent with a tract allocation theory. The
court treats the portion of unit production to which the lessor's land is
entitled as having come from the lessor's land, and a conclusion that a
nonmarketing lessee must pay royalties to its own lessor out of its own
funds is entirely consistent with the accepted statement of the tract allo-
cation theory. The tract-allocation and weighted-average theories reach
divergent results where there are several gas purchasers or split-stream
sales.59
The main support for the weighted-average method of royalty com-
putation does not come from the Prickette case, but from the traditional
Texas theory of pooling and unitization. In Veal v. Thomason 60 the
Texas Supreme Court held that a unitization agreement constituted a
cross-conveyance of mineral interests among the tracts contributed to the
unit.61 Each lessor's agreement to the plan of unitization had the effect
of conveying a part of his royalty interest to the lessor of every other
tract within the unit. Thus every lessor received a proportionate royalty
interest in every tract.
The cross-conveyances theory has been applied to pooled units
58. Id. at 645.
59. See generally Upchurch, supra note 49; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 951, 702-706.2 (1988).
60. 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
61. Id. at 349, 159 S.W.2d at 476.
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formed under oil and gas lease pooling clauses 62 as well as to unit agree-
ments and joint and community leases. It points toward the weighted-
average method of calculating royalties on a split-stream sale. If pooling
gives each lessor a pro rata interest in every tract in the unit, each lessor
no longer has a single lessee. Through cross-conveyancing, each owner
of a working interest within the unit becomes the lessee of every lessor.
Thus every lessor can claim his proportionate share of the royalty from
each sale made by each working interest owner.
It seems doubtful that any Texas court will use this analysis when
dealing with royalty computation. The cross-conveyancing theory,
which has been strongly criticized in other contexts, 63 was not mentioned
in the Prickette decision and was specifically rejected by the court in
Puckett v. First City National Bank. 4 That court distinguished Veal v.
Thomason on the ground that the issue involved in Veal, i.e., a determi-
nation of necessary parties to the litigation, was purely procedural.65
Perhaps most importantly, the cross-conveyancing theory is at odds with
standard pooling clause language. The language of the AAPL Form 675
is typical. It provides:
For the purpose of computing the royalties to which owners of royal-
ties and payments out of production and each of them shall be entitled
upon production of oil and gas, or either of them from the pooled unit,
there shall be allocated to the land covered by this Lease and included
in said unit a pro rata portion of the oil and gas, or either of them,
produced from the pooled unit after deducting that used for operations
on the pooled unit. Such allocation shall be on an acreage basis, that is
to say, there shall be allocated to the acreage covered by this Lease and
included in the pooled unit that pro rata portion of the oil and gas, or
either of them, produced from the pooled unit which the number of
surface acres covered by this Lease and included in the pooled unit
bears to the total number of surface acres included in the pooled unit.
Royalties hereunder shall be computed on the portion of such produc-
tion, whether it be oil or gas or either of them, so allocated to the land
covered by this Lease and included in the unit just as though such
production were from such land. The production from an oil well will
be considered as production from the Lease or oil pooled unit from
which it is producing and not as production from a gas pooled unit;
and production from a gas well will be considered as production from
62. Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 154 Tex. 311, 313-14, 276 S.W.2d 774, 775 (1955); Texaco,
Inc. v. Lettermann, 343 S.W.2d 726 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. See, eg., French & Elliott, The Legal Effect of Voluntary Pooling and Unitization: Theories
and Party Practice, 35 TEx. L. RFv. 401 (1957).
64. 702 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. Id.
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the Lease or gas pooled unit from which it is producing and not from
the oil pooled unit.66
Even apart from the repeated use of "allocated," the clause clearly con-
templates that proportionate shares of production will be treated as if
they came from the individual tracts which make up the pooled unit.
There is no suggestion that the pooled unit should be treated as a tenancy
in common for the purposes of computing royalty or-what may amount
to the same thing-that all royalty owners share equally in all sales of gas
produced from the unit. Although variations in lease language may oc-
casionally lead to different results, most controversies over calculating
royalties on split-stream sales in Texas should thus be resolved by using
the tract allocation method. If the lease calls for a proceeds royalty, each
lessor will receive a share of the sales price obtained by his own lessee.
b. Allocation Under Forced Pooling in Texas
A similar analysis has been made of tracts pooled under the Texas
forced-pooling statutes.67 Section 102.051 stipulates:
For the purpose of determining the portions of production owned
by the persons owning interests in the pooled unit, the production shall
be allocated to the respective tracts within the unit in the proportion
that the number of surface acres included within each tract bears to the
number of surface acres included in the entire unit.68
The court in Puckett v. First City National Bank 69 pointed out that this
language strongly suggests the tract allocation approach. Moreover, the
cross-conveyancing doctrine, which provides some theoretical support
for the weighted-average method of calculating royalties in voluntarily
pooled units, is almost certainly inapplicable to forced-pooled units.
Texas courts have repeatedly held that Railroad Commission orders
"cannot effect a change or transfer of property rights."70 Thus a forced-
pooling order could not effectuate a transfer of royalty among lessors
within a forced-pooled unit.71
66. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, 0. ANDERSON, E. SMrH, OIL AND GAS FORMS MANUAL, Form 5 at
19, 21 (1987).
67. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001 - 102.112 (Vernon 1978).
68. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.051(a) (Vernon 1978).
69. 702 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Nale v. Carroll, 155 Tex. 555, 559, 289 S.W.2d 743, 745 (1956). See also Dorchester Gas
Producing Co. v. Harlow Corp., 743 S.W.2d 243, 252 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1987) (citing Rail-
road Commission v. City of Austin, 524 S.W.2d 262, 267-68 (Tex. 1975)).
71. See Smith, The Texas Compulsory PoolingAct (pt. 2), 44 TEx. L. REv. 387, 414-16 (1966).
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2. Disparity Between Voluntarily Pooled Units and
Regulatory Units
Although tract allocation is the most commonly used method for
allocating production among tracts in a pooled unit, there are situations
which it does not clearly fit. The most serious of these occurs where a
unit pooled under the authority granted in the oil and gas lease is larger
than the drilling or proration units established by the state's regulatory
agency. Thus four tracts, each a 160-acre quarter section and each sub-
ject to an oil and gas lease authorizing pooling into a 640-acre unit, may
all be pooled into a single unit as authorized by the leases. The regula-
tory commission, however, may adopt 320-acre drilling units. If the
drilling units are designated on a north half/south half basis, there is an
obvious problem as to whether production from each well is allocated
only between the two tracts making up the drilling unit or among all four
tracts under the contractual pooling accomplished under the terms of the
leases. If the wells produce different volumes and are subject to split-
stream sales at different prices, disputes about royalty computation are
assured.72
There is no easy solution to this problem. The language of the lease,
which speaks in terms of the contractually pooled unit rather than prora-
tion or drilling units, suggests that for purposes of calculating royalty the
production from each well should be allocated on a surface acreage basis
among all four tracts, i.e., twenty-five percent of the production from
each well is allocated to each tract. This solution is not likely to satisfy
the lessors of the two tracts assigned to the 320-acre unit of the more
productive well, and if the pooling clause permits modifications of the
pooled unit, they may well argue that their lessors are under an implied
duty to reduce the size of the units pooled under the lease to conform
with the drilling or proration units.
3. Applicability of the Shut-In Royalty Clause
In many instances gas is being sold from the unit well, but an indi-
vidual lessee is not marketing its share of the gas. Can the lessee treat the
gas well as shut-in and tender payments based on the shut-in royalty
clause, or must the lessee pay royalty on its proportionate share of pro-
duction, even though it is neither using nor selling it? The traditional
function of the shut-in royalty provision has been to provide the lessee
72. See R. Grable, Selected Problems in Split-Stream Production, (presented at Advanced Oil,
Gas and Mineral Law Course, Paper C, State Bar of Texas Sept. 17, 1987).
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with a means for maintaining the lease at a time when it is unable to
market the gas.73 Looked at from this general perspective, the shut-in
clause would appear to be applicable. In specific instances, however, the
answer depends upon the language of the lease, and most leases probably
require a payment based on production.
The shut-in provision is not likely to have been drafted to cover this
situation. Many leases use language authorizing the payment of shut-in
royalties, such as: "If, at any time or times after the expiration of the
primary term, all such wells are shut-in for a period of ninety consecutive
days, and during such time there are no operations on said land .... "'
If the gas well in question is producing, this type of clause will obviously
not apply.
The same is probably true of a shut-in royalty clause like that used
in the AAPL Form 675 oil and gas lease, which provides for a shut-in
royalty "[w]hile there is a gas well on this Lease, on an acreage pooled
therewith, but gas is not being sold or used."7 Such a clause can be
interpreted to permit the payment of shut-in royalty only by implying the
phrase "by the lessee" after the reference to gas "not being sold or used."
Whether a court would do so is open to question. The phrase was im-
plied in the operations clause in Hughes v. Cantwell7 6 where leases to
different companies had been executed by co-owners of land. The court
held that drilling operations by one lessee did not excuse the payment of
delay rentals by the other lessee. It should be noted, however, that in
Hughes the implied language benefitted the lessor, rather than the lessee,
and that in most other instances analogous disputes are resolved in ac-
cordance with the precise language of the lease.77
There are additional arguments against permitting the nonmarket-
ing lessee to invoke the shut-in royalty clause. The payment of shut-in
royalties in this situation is almost certainly contrary to the intent and
expectation of the lessor. The traditional purpose of shut-in clauses was
to permit the maintenance of a lease past its primary term if a well could
not be produced because of the lack of pipeline connections for gas pro-
duction. Here actual production and marketing are taking place.
Although loss of royalty on production as a result of drainage to adjacent
73. Lowe, Shut-in Royalty Problems, 5 EASTERN MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-24 (1984).
74. Producers 88 (7-69) Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease; Pound Printing & Stationery Co. (copy on
file with TULSA LAW JOURNAL).
75. E. KuNTz, J. LOWE, 0. ANDERSON, E. SMrrH, OIL AND GAS FORMS MANUAL, Form 5,
at 20 (1987).
76. 540 S.W.2d 742 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 503.1.
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tracts is possible if a well is shut in, the loss of the economic benefit from
royalties on production is even more acute where other lessees in the
pooled unit are selling gas specifically attributable to the lessor's
property.
Perhaps the most serious problem with relying on the shut-in roy-
alty clause is that in most leases the languages of the pooling clause pre-
cludes its use. The royalty and pooling clauses typically require the
payment of a royalty on production whenever production takes place.
As indicated previously, most pooling clauses "allocate" unit production
to each tract within a pooled unit. They may not only make such an
allocation, but go on to provide: "the production so allocated shall be
considered for all purposes, including payment or delivery of royalty...
to be the entire production of unitized minerals from the land to which
allocated in the same manner as though produced therefrom under the
terms of this lease.""8 The royalty clause, in turn, requires a payment to
the lessor whenever gas is produced from the land and sold.
4. Calculation of Royalty: The Underproduced Lessee
Even though a lessee is not marketing gas, most leases will probably
require a payment of royalty on the production which the pooling clause
allocates to a tract. In this situation the royalty will come entirely or in
part from the lessee's own pocket, depending on the terms of the operat-
ing agreement. However, the amount of the royalty may be subject to
dispute. If the lease requires the royalty to be based upon market value,
the parties may sharply disagree over what the market value is or how it
should be ascertained. A similar problem will arise under a proceeds
royalty: Since the lessee is not receiving "proceeds," how should the roy-
alty be calculated?
Few, if any, printed form leases are drafted with this precise prob-
lem in mind. The term "proceeds" is rarely defined. For example, the
royalty provision of the AAPL Form 675 simply provides "on gas sold at
the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from
such sale."7 9 Read literally, such language requires the lessee to pay a
royalty based upon the sales price received by the lessees in the unit that
are marketing gas. If only the operator is selling gas, the royalty is based
upon the sales price it received. If several parties are selling gas, the
78. Producers 88 (7-69) Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease: Pound Printing & Stationery Co. (copy on
file with TULSA LAW JOURNAL).
79. E. KuNTz, J. LoWE, 0. ANDERSON, E. SMITH, OIL AND GAS FORMS MANUAL, Form 5,
at 20 (1987).
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royalty is presumably based upon an average price, adjusted in accord-
ance with the proportion of gas marketed under each separate contract.
As an underproduced party, the nonmarketing lessee will at some
future time have a right to be brought into balance with the other work-
ing interest owners in the pooled unit. If the lessees and working interest
owners in the pooled unit have entered into a gas balancing agreement,
its terms will usually control80 and will govern the mechanism and time
for bringing the underproduced party back into balance.8 If there is no
such agreement, the rights of the working interest owners will be decided
under the provisions of their operating agreement82 or in some instances
by statute83 or by common law.
4
If the balancing is in kind, the lessee will have a temporary right to
sell a disproportionate amount of gas. During this period the lessee
should not owe royalty on that part of the proceeds attributable to the
increase in the lessee's fractional share of production. Royalty has al-
ready been paid on this gas. In some respects the lessee is in a position
analogous to that of a pipeline exercising its make-up rights under a take-
or-pay contract. The make-up clause typically allows a pipeline to take
gas that it has already paid for in earlier years. The nonmarketing lessee,
which has been required to pay the lessor a royalty on gas which the
80. See Art. II of the 1977 and 1982 versions of the AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement.
In some jurisdictions, however, statutes provide for types of gas balancing between marketing and
nonmarketing parties which may override the terms of the gas balancing agreement. See, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 541-547 (Supp. 1987) and Comment, A New Dimension in the Ratable Tak-
ing of Natural Gas in Oklahoma: Enrolled House Bill 1221, 20 TULSA L. J. 77 (1984). The constitu-
tionality of the Oklahoma statute was upheld in Seal v. Corporation Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278 (Okla.
1986), appeal dismissed, Amerada Hess Corp. v. Corp. Comm'n, 479 U.S. 1073 (1987).
81. For suggestions for drafting gas balancing agreements, see B. Campbell, Gas Balancing
Agreements, Oil and Gas Agreements, Paper No. 9 presented at Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. May
13, 1983); Upchurch, Split Stream Gas Sales and the Gas Storage and Balancing Agreement, 24
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 665 (1978); J. Walker, Gas Balancing Agreements, (presented at Ad-
vanced Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Course, Paper E, State Bar of Texas Oct. 3, 1985); R. Grable,
Selected Problems in Split-Stream Production, (presented at Advanced Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
Course, Paper C, State Bar of Texas Sept. 17, 1987).
82. See Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, Investors and
Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1 (1986).
83. See Smith, Gas Marketing by Co-owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Les-
sors' Claims to Royalty, 39 BAYLOR L. RaV. 365, 399-402 (1987).
84. In some situations the provisions of the operating agreement may have the effect of simply
referring the parties to their rights at common law. If the operator is selling all unit gas production
and neither buys the nonoperators' share of gas for resale nor markets it on their behalf, the parties
may be treated as cotenants, with each entitled to receive a proportionate share of the net profits
received by the operator. For a discussion of the arguments for and against this position, see Smith,
Gas Marketing by co-owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors' Claims to Royalty,
39 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 382-84 (1987). Common law principles will almost certainly apply if the
operating agreement was prepared as if a gas balancing agreement had been attached, but no balanc-
ing agreement has ever been attached.
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lessee neither used nor sold, should not be required to pay royalty when
it later sells an amount of gas equivalent to that on which its earlier roy-
alty payments were based.
Balancing in kind may not be feasible. The gas contract obtained by
the underproduced lessee may not permit a temporary increase in the
amount of gas sold. 5 Even if there is no contractual obstacle to balanc-
ing in kind, other impediments may exist. The reservoir may be too de-
pleted to permit gas balancing, or agency regulations may restrict
production or sales to assure ratable taking or to compensate for past
production that exceeded a well's allowable. In such situations other al-
ternatives for balancing the underproduced party must be considered.
The relatively few cases which have dealt with the rights of an un-
derproduced party who later begins marketing its gas have awarded an
immediate cash balancing, based upon the price received by the market-
ing party. 6 Since in most instances the underproduced lessee will have
already paid a royalty based on this price, it will owe no additional roy-
alty to the lessor. If the payment exceeds the price on which the royalties
were calculated, an additional royalty, based on the excess, will be paya-
ble. If the payment is based on a lower price, the lessee has a claim for
reimbursement against the royalty owners. This result clearly follows
under those leases which provide for royalty on sales "by the lessee." In
the absence of such language the result, while less certain, should be the
same. The tract allocation method of determining royalty which most
leases explicitly or impliedly adopt limits the royalty to the sale price
received by each lessor's own lessee. 87 The cash payment received to
balance out the gas accounts retroactively establishes that price.88
The same type of analysis should apply if cash balancing is delayed
until reservoir depletion. The lessee should owe royalty on the money
received only to the extent it exceeds the price used for calculating the
royalties already paid.
85. See Hillyer, Problems in Producing and Selling, By Split or Single Stream, Gas Allocable to
Diverse Working Interest Ownerships, 16 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 243, 263 (1965).
86. United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Premier Resources, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 127 (W.D.
Okla. 1980). See also Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
87. Puckett v. First City Nat'l Bank, 702 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
88. A discussion of the various factors which should be considered in determining the price
used for cash balancing can be found in E. Kutcrz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 77.3 (1978).
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III. THE EFFECT OF OTHER INSTRUMENTS ON ROYALTY
OBLIGATIONS OWED UNDER THE OIL AND GAS LEASE
The foregoing discussion of the lessee's royalty obligations focuses
primarily upon the language of the oil and gas lease, especially the roy-
alty, shut-in royalty, and pooling clauses. To what extent, however, may
the royalty obligations imposed or affected by these clauses be modified
by other instruments entered into by one or both the parties to the lease?
Such instruments fall into two basic categories: contracts, such as the
operating agreement, which have been entered into by the lessee and a
third party; and agreements, such as the division order, entered into by
the parties to the lease.
A. Operating Agreements and Other Contracts Between the Lessee and
Third Parties
As a general proposition, it seems unlikely that the lessor's right to
royalty established by the oil and gas lease can be altered by a contract
entered into between the lessee and a third party. There are a few cases to
the contrary, but they tend to turn on exceptional fact patterns. Thus in
Cook v. Thompkins89 the lessor had not been paid her share of royalties
by the company to whom the lessee had sold her share of the oil because
the oil purchaser, which was now bankrupt, did not have her address. In
this instance Ms. Cook was effectively bound by the contract between her
lessee and the oil purchaser because the lessee had acted as her agent in
selling her proportionate share of it. Since she owned a stated fraction of
production in kind and had failed to make arrangements for storing or
marketing it, she had impliedly authorized the lessee to market it on her
behalf.
Most other oil and gas cases which treat an agreement as affected by
a subsequent contract entered into by only one of the parties involve oil
and gas deeds. There are several cases which effectively treat the pooling
clause of an oil and gas lease as modifying a deed creating a term mineral
or royalty interest, even though only one party to the deed is a party to
the oil and gas lease. These decisions hold that production from a pooled
unit maintains the term interest, even though the well is located off the
tract that is subject to the interest.9" These cases are generally limited to
89. 713 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1986).
90. See Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d 914
(1952); Williamson v. Federal Land Bank, 326 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
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pooling, however, for the shut-in royalty provision does not have such an
effect. The payment of shut-in royalty will not keep a term royalty or
mineral interest in effect because "the language of the lease does not
either expressly or by implication extend the term" of the deed.9
The cases involving payment of gas royalty based upon market value
are closer in point, and they provide little or no support for treating the
lease as modified by a separate contract to which the lessor is not a party.
Unlike oil production, which is generally owned in kind by both the les-
sor and the lessee proportionately to their royalty and working interest
shares, gas production is owned exclusively by the lessee. The lessor is
entitled to a royalty calculated in cash. Several states have held that a
lessor who is entitled to a royalty based on the market value of the gas
produced and sold is not bound by the price established in a gas purchase
contract entered into by the lessee. If the price is less than current mar-
ket value, the lessor can insist upon having his royalty calculated on the
basis of the higher value.92 In such states governmental price regulations
may determine market value,93 or at least be relevant to such a determi-
nation;94 but the private contract between the producer and the pipline
purchaser does not automatically establish market value.
Logically, the operating agreement and gas balancing agreement
should be similarly ineffective to modify the lessor's royalty rights. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the operating agreement does
not affect the habendum clause of the lease. In Hininger v. Kaiser9" the
court held that administrative expenses which the operating agreement
imposed upon the lessee should not be taken into account in calculating
whether a well was producing in paying quantities. Thus it seems un-
likely that a nonmarketing lessee can successfully argue that it owes no
royalty on gas production because the operating agreement gives the op-
erator the right to market the operator's own share of gas, while refusing
to buy or market the gas of a nonoperator who does not have a gas sales
contract. The existence of a gas balancing agreement providing explicit
91. Archer County v. Webb, 161 Tex. 210, 338 S.W.2d 435 (1960).
92. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985); Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d 1335 (1983), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 322 (1985); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (rex. 1968).
93. First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1981); Bowers v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 692 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1982); Flowers v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 693 F,2d 1146 (5th Cir.
1982).
94. Matzen v. Cities Service Oil Co., 233 Kan. 846, 667 P.2d 337 (1983), cert. dismissed, Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Batchelder, 468 U.S. 1222 (1984).
95. 738 P.2d 137 (Okla. 1987).
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guidance for make-up rights in kind or in cash would not seem to change
the result.
B. Division Orders
Unlike the operating agreement, balancing agreement, or gas
purchase contract, the division order is executed by the lessor. Thus
there are far fewer conceptual problems in treating this instrument as
affecting the lessor's rights. Just how it affects the lessor's rights is open
to question, however. If the previous discussions suffered from a lack of
case law to analyze, the division order cases present the opposite prob-
lem: There are too many cases saying too many things without clearly
articulating the legal theories used.
The basic functions of the division order are to specify how funds
from the sale of production should be distributed and to protect the dis-
tributor from liability for improper payment.96 A division order executed
by a lessor may occasionally serve other functions. For example, a coten-
ant who has not signed a lease may ratify it if the cotenant signs a divi-
sion order containing an express ratification clause.97 Even without a
ratification clause a division order may have this effect if it clearly refers
to the existing lease and the cotenant accepts royalty payments under
it.98 Usually, however, a division order will not be effective to accom-
plish a purpose outside the scope of the instrument. In Bradley v. Av-
ery99 a division order was ineffective to revive a lease. A well on the
property in question had not produced for over two months when it was
reworked and brought back into production. The court concluded that
the cessation of production was not "temporary" and that the lease had
terminated.'" New division orders executed by the landowners did not
revive the lease, for there was no clearly stated intent to do so. The divi-
sion orders did not describe the land, contained no language of grant,
and did not even refer to the terminated oil and gas lease.
1. Effect on a Lessor's Claim to Royalty
It is difficult to generalize too broadly about the effect of a division
order upon a lessor's right to royalty. The nature of the division order is
96. See Hollimon, Division Orders-A Primer, 34 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 313 (1983).
97. Pope v. Pennzoil Producing Co., 288 Ark. 10, 701 S.W.2d 488 (1986).
98. See Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Kirtley, 288 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926, writ
ref'd).
99. 746 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1988).
100. Id. at 343.
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unclear, and the principal natural gas producing states are divided on its
effect. The Kansas courts have held that a division order is normally
ineffective to change the method of calculating royalty specified in the
underlying oil and gas lease. They have reasoned that since its purpose is
primarily to protect the pipeline purchaser by directing it how to dis-
tribute payment for the gas, the division order should be viewed as part
of the contract between the purchaser and producer, rather than as an
amendment or modification of the lease."' 1 The result in Oklahoma
seems less certain, although there is some authority that a lessor who
executes a division order and accepts payments authorized by it is not
estopped to challenge the basis upon which the payments have been cal-
culated. 102 The leading Texas case addressing the issue is Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton,1°3 which involved a claim by the lessee that the lessors' right
to market-value royalties had been modified by division orders authoriz-
ing payments for royalties to be computed on the basis of gas sales. The
court of appeals used a traditional contract analysis. It found that the
lessors' agreement to accept royalties calculated on a basis different from
that provided in the oil and gas lease was supported by consideration -
the lessee's agreement (not expressly set out in the lease) to keep records
available for inspection by the lessors at all times. Under this analysis
the lessors were not only precluded from recovering for underpayment of
back royalty, they should also be barred from seeking royalties based on
market value in the future. They were bound by language in the division
order agreement stating that it "shall remain in force during the life of
the respective lease(s) under-which payment is due .... ,,1 According
to the court, the effect of a division order depends upon its terms. "Rou-
tine division orders without ... consideration" are revocable at will; if
supported by consideration, they are irrevocable if the agreement so
provided.105
This holding was partially reversed by the Texas Supreme Court. It
held the division orders binding, but only so long as the parties acted
under them. The court reinstated the trial court's holding that they had
been revoked when the lessors filed suit against their lessee. Hence the
101. Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d 1335 (1983), cert. denied 106 S. Ct.
322 (1985); Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 222 Kan. 733, 567 P.2d 1326 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1065 (1978).
102. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Okla. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971).
103. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
104. Id. at 251.
105. Id.
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lessors' claim for royalties based on a market value higher than the price
provided in the sales contract was valid, but was limited to the period
after revocation.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's contract
analysis. It did not articulate a clear alternative theory, but used lan-
guage strongly suggesting accord and satisfaction. It quoted at length a
Fifth Circuit case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Williams,06 suggesting that
division orders are a method of settling a dispute over what the market
value of the gas actually is. Although not directly discussed by the court,
estoppel is an alternative theory on which the court might have rested its
decision.
There are problems with all three possible approaches. Under a
contract analysis division orders are binding if there is consideration.
Barring special circumstances, such as fraud or misrepresentation, there
is no apparent reason why division orders cannot be made to bind the
lessor for the duration of the underlying oil and gas lease. Finding con-
sideration may not always be easy, however. Although future division
orders can undoubtedly be drafted to provide for new duties, the exist-
ence of consideration in existing division orders may well be a matter of
considerable dispute. The appellate court recognized that "routine divi-
sion orders" are not given for consideration, 10 7 and the presence of con-
sideration in the division orders in the case is at least questionable. The
duty to make available the records upon which royalties were calcu-
lated-which the appellate court relied on-may arguably have been im-
plicit in the oil and gas lease royalty provisions and hence inadequate to
constitute new consideration supporting modification of the royalty obli-
gations. If there is no consideration, then there is no enforceable con-
tract. The division orders cannot modify the royalty obligations
contained in the lease nor bar the lessor from recovering for back un-
derpaid royalties. Other doctrines, such as estoppel, waiver, and the stat-
ute of limitations, may constitute barriers to recovery, but they must be
pled and proved.
A theory of division orders based upon accord and satisfaction
presents at least two problems. One is identical to that posed by a con-
tract analysis. If the division order is treated as settling the issue of mar-
ket value for all payments under the lease, it should be binding as to all
payments made at all times under the lease. The accord and satisfaction
106. 158 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1946).
107. Exxon Corp., 613 S.W.2d at 250-51.
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concept is consistent with the result reached by the Texas Supreme Court
only if the acceptance of each payment made under the division order is
deemed a separate transaction. By revoking the division order, the lessor
rejects its effect as to future transactions. Such an arrangement is per-
fectly feasible but is not readily apparent from the language used in the
division orders in Middleton.
The second problem is inherent in the assumption that the parties
have agreed to settle a dispute. Most division orders are signed shortly
after gas is first produced and sold, when the sale price and market price
are likely to be identical. It is highly unlikely that most lessors sign them
to resolve the meaning of "market value." Indeed, in most market value
royalty cases the lessors were apparently unaware until shortly before
filing suit that there was any meaningful difference in the royalty lan-
guage of the lease and the terms of the division order. They did not
knowingly accept payments based on sales price in satisfaction of the
lessee's obligation to tender larger royalties whose amount was uncertain.
Such knowledge is normally essential to a valid accord and satisfaction.
In Flowers v. Diamond Shamrock Corp. 10 the Fifth Circuit held that the
endorsement of a check "issued in full settlement of the account stated"
did not constitute an accord and satisfaction of the lessee's market value
royalty obligations because there was no showing that the lessee was
aware of any dispute over the amount owed. 10 9 As the court there stated:
The requirement of a bona fide dispute presupposes both parties'
knowledge that there exists a particular issue as to a greater liability
that is settled by the accord .... In the present instance, no evidence
whatsoever shows that the Flowers had or should have had any knowl-
edge, at the time, that negotiation of these checks would affect or settle
a disagreement as to the market value of the gas on which royalties
were based. Shamrock's position at all times was that plaintiffs were
being paid in accordance with the lease, and there is no evidence in the
record that any of the plaintiffs were aware of the incorrectness of that
position under Vela. 11°
The execution of a division order is obviously different from the endorse-
ment of a check. The theory of the effect of the two instruments is the
same, however. Hence, it is difficult to see why the use of different types
of instruments should lead to different legal outcomes.
A third theory, estoppel, is a possible alternative basis for explaining
Middleton, but it also presents problems. On the facts as set forth by the
108. 693 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1982).
109. Id. at 1152-53.
110. Id. at 1152.
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court, it is difficult to find any traditional reliance by the lessee on the
lessors' division orders. The long term gas contract entered into by Sun
Oil Company predated the division orders executed by Sun's lessors"'
and so could not have been made in reliance upon the lessors' willingness
to abide by a royalty calculation based on the contract price. Moreover,
there is no suggestion in the case that Sun gave up a right or opportunity
to renegotiate the contract because the lessors were accepting payments
based on the contract price. The absence of such types of reliance may
explain why the court does not advance estoppel as a basis for its
holding.
The absence of a clearly stated legal theory justifying the effect given
division orders has not noticeably weakened the Texas Supreme Court's
enthusiasm for its decision in Middleton. The court has repeatedly reaf-
firmed the holding. Thus it may be more helpful to describe the effect of
division orders in recent cases involving various kinds of royalty disputes
than attempt to find a legal theory explaining them.
2. Effect on the Implied Marketing Covenant
Under the Middleton holding a division order is binding until re-
voked. A lessor entitled to a market value calculation of royalty but paid
on the basis of the gas' sales price is barred from seeking additional re-
covery for the period while the division orders were in effect. A more
recent case indicates that the Texas Supreme Court has now extended the
effect of division orders one step further. Until quite recently, it was
widely assumed that division orders have no effect upon a lessee's poten-
tial liability for breach of implied covenants.' 2 Cabot Corp. v. Brown 113
strongly suggest that a division order not only bars a claim based on an
express royalty clause, but also a claim based on breach of the implied
covenant to market gas production.
In Cabot Corp. the lessee had dedicated gas to an interstate pipeline
and thus subjected it to pricing regulation by the FPC under the Natural
Gas Act. The division orders executed by the lessor obligated the lessee
to pay royalties based on the price established by the FPC "if such sale be
subject to the Federal Power Commission.""' 4 One ground of complaint
by the lessor was that she had not been paid royalties based on market
111. The gas purchase contract between Sun Oil Co. and Pan American Gas Co. was dated July
5, 1951, whereas the division orders were executed in 1952. Exxon Corp., 613 S.W.2d at 249.
112. See, eg., Hollimon, supra note 96, at 34546.
113. 754 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1988).
114. Id. at 105.
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value, as required by her lease. The court viewed this claim as clearly
controlled by Middleton.t 5 It also treated Middleton as controlling her
second ground of complaint, which was based on a much different the-
ory. She alleged the lessee had breached its duty to seek an abandonment
of the dedication to interstate commerce. If the abandonment request
had been granted, the gas would have been free of FPC jurisdiction and
available for marketing at the higher prices paid in the intrastate market.
The Court did not discuss whether the lessee had any obligation to seek
abandonment or if there was proof that such action by the lessee would
have resulted in higher royalties to the lessor. Rather, treating the plain-
tiff's complaint as a claimed breach of the implied marketing covenant, it
stated that the division orders barred a claim for higher back royalties
based on implied lease provisions, just as they barred such a claim based
on express lease provisions."16
As one commentator has pointed out, 17 there is a potential incon-
sistency between the holding in Cabot Corp. and that in Amoco Produc-
tion Co. v. First Baptist Church." 8 The latter case permitted a lessor to
recover damages based upon its lessee's failure to act in good faith when
it entered into a gas sales contract providing for benefits that were not
shared with the lessor. Arguments for permitting a lessor to claim roy-
alty based upon take-or-pay settlements rely heavily upon it." 9
The court in Cabot Corp. apparently recognized the tension between
its two decisions and attempted to reconcile them on two grounds. It
pointed out that the lease in Amoco called for a "proceeds" royalty rather
than a royalty based on market value and that the division order in
Amoco did not purport to change the net proceeds basis for calculating
royalty provided by the lease. 120
The relevance of the first distinctions is not entirely clear. It is true
that a "proceeds" lease may lead to a claimed breach of the implied mar-
keting covenant on the ground that the contract price is too low; whereas
such a contention is largely irrelevant in a market value lease because the
lessor's royalty is not automatically based on the sales price of the gas.
115. Id. at 107.
116. Id.
117. M. Cockrell, The Implied Marketing Obligation: Development and Current Implications,
(presented at the 14th Inst. on Oil, Gas & Min. L., co-sponsored by the Oil, Gas & Mineral Law
Section of Texas and Texas Law School April 15, 1987).
118. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex Civ. App.-El Paso 1979), writ ref'd per curiam n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d
610 (Tex. 1980).
119. See, eg., Lowe, supra note 30, at 563.
120. Cabot Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 107.
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However, Cabot Corp. is one of the rare cases where breach of the im-
plied marketing covenant can be claimed even though the lease contains
a market value royalty clause. The lessor's marketing covenant argu-
ment is based on the lessee's alleged failure to get the gas released from
FPC price regulation. The second distinction is not fully articulated by
the court. It is possibly based on a conclusion that division orders in
Cabot Corp. changed the terms of the royalty clause. Since the division
order in Cabot Corp. recognized the possibility that the gas would be
subject to FPC jurisdiction, the court may have reasoned that the lessor
implicitly accepted sales of gas in interstate commerce as good faith mar-
keting which complied with all implied marketing obligations.
The conclusion suggested by the court's discussion in Cabot Corp. is
that a division order will supplant the implied marketing covenant unless
it specifically indicates that it does not change the method of payment
called for by the lease. 12' The court does not make clear why specific
lease language indicating how a royalty will be calculated, e.g., "when
sold by lessee, one-eighth of the amount realized by lessee," does not
negate the implied covenant to market gas at a reasonable price, whereas
specific division order language indicating the method of calculation has
that effect.
In applying the division order holding in Middleton to an action
based on breach of the implied marketing covenant, the Texas Supreme
Court may well be mixing apples and oranges. An action for underpay-
ment of a specific contract amount, such as was brought in Middleton, is
conceptually different from an action for damages based upon failure to
market reasonably or diligently. The distinction is clearer in a situation
where the alleged breach is not based on the sale of gas for an unreasona-
bly small amount, but on an unreasonable delay in seeking and obtaining
a contract. The basis for the cause of action in such a situation is the
same as in Cabot Corp.-breach of the implied covenant to market gas
production-but it is difficult to understand why executing division or-
ders once a contract is finally obtained should bar the lessor's claim for
damages based on unreasonable delay in entering into that contract.
3. When Is a Lessor's Claim Not Barred?
Division orders do not preclude a successful suit for back royalties
121. The importance of the precise language used in the division order was also made clear in a
recent Texas Supreme Court opinion which was withdrawn after the parties to the litigation entered
into a settlement agreement. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140, with-
drawn, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988).
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in all instances. Claims based on fraud are exempted from the holding in
Middleton.'22 Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc. 123 is the best known recent
case refusing to find division orders a bar to a recovery of back royalties.
It arguably falls into the "mathematical error" category, although that
was not the ground relied on by the court in holding in favor of the
royalty owners. The dispute arose because of the misreading of a fifteen-
year term royalty which gave the plaintiffs an undivided one-half nonpar-
ticipating royalty in all oil and gas produced from the land conveyed. An
oil and gas lease providing for a one-eighth royalty was later executed on
the land subject to the term royalty. The lawyer who did the title exami-
nation for the lessee erroneously read the deed containing the term roy-
alty as reserving one-half of the royalty in the plaintiffs. He thus
concluded that they were entitled to one-sixteenth of the gross produc-
tion under the oil and gas lease. The plaintiffs, who apparently read the
reservation the same way initially, executed division orders prepared by
the lessee reflecting a right to a one-sixteenth royalty. The lessee made
payments of royalty on this basis until the royalty owners revoked the
division order two days before the termination of the fifteen year term.
They then filed suit for the $2.4 million which they had been underpaid.
In rejecting the lessee's argument that the division orders were bind-
ing until revoked, the Texas Supreme Court distinguished Middleton and
earlier cases on the ground that the defendants in such cases had not
received a positive benefit from the mistake in division orders.12 In
Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 2 ' the operator had relied upon transfer orders in
overpaying one set of royalty owners and underpaying another set and
had not retained any royalty to which it was not entitled. In Middleton,
where the lessors complained of payment on the basis of sales price
rather than the higher market price, the operator also had not received
any money which should have been remitted to the royalty owners. In
Gavenda, however, the defendant operator had not only prepared the er-
roneous division orders itself, it had also affirmatively benefited from the
error by retaining the seven-sixteenths of production owed the plaintiffs.
122. 613 S.W.2d 240, 251, n.8 (Tex. 1981).
123. 705 S.W.2d 690 CIex. 1986).
124. Id. at 692.
125. 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956). On somewhat analogous facts, a Louisiana court
held that the underpaid royalty owner was entitled to recover from the lessee and that the lessee was
entitled to recover the amount of overpayment from the royalty owner who had received more than
her share of the royalty. Matthews v. Sun Exploration and Production Co., 521 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct.
App. 1988).
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The court held that under such circumstances the division order did not
prevent a claim for unpaid royalties for the period before revocation.
Gavenda clearly differs from Chicago Corp. v. Wall, where the mis-
take in the transfer orders was apparently made by the royalty owners
themselves. The court's distinction of Middleton is open to question. In
both cases the lessees had prepared the division orders; hence the only
reason given for the difference in result was the presence or absence of
benefit to the lessee from its own mistake. But a lessee that fails to make
out-of-pocket payments owed to a royalty owner benefits from its mis-
take as fully as a lessee that keeps income that should have been paid to
the royalty owner. The lessees in both instances are wealthier to the ex-
tent that the royalty owner has failed to receive moneys owed.
As questionable as the court's distinction may be, the express hold-
ing of Gavenda, which refuses to permit an operator to rely on division
orders if it prepares the instruments understating the amount of royalty
owed and benefits from its own mistake, does not seem to be either ineq-
uitable or unfair. The considerations are similar to those stated by the
Kansas Supreme Court in Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp.:
Where a division order prepared by the lessee of an oil and gas
lease for the lessor's signature unilaterally attempts to amend the oil
and gas leases to deprive the royalty owner of interest on royalties held
in suspense, to which the royalty owner is otherwise entitled under the
leasing contract, and the lessor signs the division order without consid-
eration from the lessee, the provision waiving interest is null and
void. 1
2 6
Nonetheless, the Gavenda holding further complicates the task of recon-
ciling the division order cases under a single coherent legal theory or,
more practically, of advising a client with a fact situation different from
any heretofore litigated.
IV. THE EFFECT OF DIVISION ORDERS ON
CURRENT ROYALTY ISSUES
Claims based on payments or settlements of take-or-pay obligations
may have already supplanted market-value claims as the major source of
royalty litigation. Disputes over royalty obligations owed by under-
produced and overproduced lessees who have pooled their interests and
have different marketing arrangements are likely to assume an equally
126. Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 222 Kan. 733, 567 P.2d 1326 (1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1065
(1978).
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important role. To what extent will a division order preclude a success-
ful assertion of such claims?
The difference in language of individual division orders, the absence
of a clear theoretical basis for the holdings in the division order cases,
and the uncertain validity of the royalty claims themselves make any an-
swer highly speculative. As matters now stand, however, the following
tentative conclusions can be suggested.
A lessor's right to royalty on payments made pursuant to a take-or-
pay clause is far from settled, but existing case law and the language of
most lease forms suggest that such claims will be unsuccessful. Thus the
question of a division order's effect is likely to be limited to the somewhat
more viable claims to share in settlements for past take-or-pay obliga-
tions, buy-outs and buy-downs. It is at least arguable that in Texas the
division order constitutes a barrier to all such claims. The royalty owner
is seeking relief analogous to that denied in Middleton: He is seeking to
have his royalty recalculated on the basis of a price other than that re-
ceived by his lessee for each unit of gas produced and accepted by him
under his unrevoked division orders. That acceptance constituted an ac-
cord and satisfaction of the disputed right to royalty on take-or-pay pay-
ments and settlements. Further, under Cabot Corp. the division order
negates the implied marketing covenant and also any implied duty which
the lessee has to share benefits from gas marketing with the lessee.
Such an analysis would not be applicable to a state such as Kansas
which normally treats the division order as having no effect on the les-
sor's claim to royalty. It may, indeed, overstate the effect of such instru-
ments even in Texas. Claims to royalties on some types of settlements
fall well outside the Middleton holding. In a buy-down, the gas pur-
chaser is making a payment in exchange for lowering the contract price
on future gas takes. The lessor should be entitled to share in this pay-
ment, if not when received, then at least when the gas to which it relates
is produced. The typical division order calls for payment on the basis of
proceeds, the terms of the lease, or the gas contract. If the royalty pay-
ments do not take the buy-down into account, the lessor has not been
paid in accordance with the terms of the division order and the lessor's
suit can be based on breach of that instrument, rather than the underly-
ing lease. The same may also be true of "buy-outs" made in exchange for
terminating future take-or-pay obligations.
The effect of division orders on royalty disputes arising from pooled
leases is slightly clearer. As indicated previously, the tract allocation
[Vol. 24:509
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doctrine, which most states and most lease pooling clauses have seem-
ingly adopted, probably eliminates claims for back royalties based on
split-stream sales by some other lessee which has pooled its working in-
terest into the unit. A division order may serve to ratify this method of
computation. 127 Logically a division order could also authorize this
method of computation even though the lease is silent or provides for
averaging. Similarly, a division order can determine the time when roy-
alties must be paid by a lessee in a pooled unit. 128 A division order could
make royalty obligations "subject to the terms of any applicable operat-
ing agreement or balancing agreement." ' 9 Such a division order will be
revoked, of course, if its effect is to delay the lessor's royalty payments to
a final in-cash payment on reservoir depletion.
V. CONCLUSION
A lawyer seeking to advise a client on any of the newer issues in-
volving royalty rights has uncertain sign posts for guidance. There is
little case law dealing with the types of royalty claims now being as-
serted. The extent, if any, to which division orders bar a lessor from
successfully asserting such claims is conjectural. The division order cases
are so numerous and so diverse that reconciling them is difficult, and
generalizing about their effect is virtually impossible. Division orders, at
least in Texas, are clearly controlling until revoked. They control some
claims based on breach of the implied marketing covenant as well as
claims to higher back royalties based on market value. Beyond that, ex-
actly what they control remains uncertain.
127. E.g., Puckett v. First City Nat'l Bank, 702 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
128. TXO Production Corp. v. Prickette, 653 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1983).
129. This language is used in the Kraftbilt Oil and Gas Division Order form. See E. KUNrz, J.
LOWE, 0. ANDERSON & E. SMrrH, OIL AND GAS FORMS MANUAL, Form 13 at 97.
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